Let me also say something about moral truth, since part of your narrative consists in the liberation from "ultimate truth". My own views on this topic are constantly shifting, but here's my current take on it.

Suppose that moral discussion proceeds much as we've pictured it in our recent exchanges. Participants to the discussion come in with their personal concerns, interests, prejudices, loves and hates. But instead of fighting it out, they sit down and try to reconcile their differences.

Ideally they would like to end up with a common viewpoint, a position that would enable them to evaluate actions and feelings as appropriate or not. Even if that's not to be had, they can at least accept some general policies of conduct.

So the conversation has a point, located in more or less idealized social practice. Participants in such a practice make a distinction - a practical distinction - between getting it right and getting it wrong (or, getting it more or less right). This seems to me to commit the discussants to the idea of moral truth.

I don't actually want to insists on the word "true". My point is that moral discourse has much the same formal structure as any factual discourse.

Some claims will be accepted (P), some conditionally accepted (If P then Q), and consequences drawn (Q). Also claims will be treated as incompatible: Not both(P and Q), in case Q entails Not-P. One just uses the truth predicate to generalize on such inferential patterns, patterns that are already there in moral discourse and practice.

In sum, truth comes for free, and not as an extra metaphysical commitment, because truth just piggy-backs on logical structure of discourse.